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Reading Nietzsche with Irigaray 
Not your garden-variety philosophy 
Kelly Oliver  
 
To be sure, I am a forest, and a night of dark trees: but he who is not afraid of my 
darkness, will find banks full of roses under my cypresses…. 
― Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 1 
 
I first encountered Luce Irigaray’s work in the mid-1980’s when I was 
writing my dissertation on Nietzsche at Northwestern. Up to the mid-1970’s, 
feminism was dominated by second wave notions of equality. And, 
philosophy still only reluctantly considered Simone de Beauvoir among its 
ranks (in spite of her own protestations to the contrary). Feminist philosophy 
was primarily aimed at criticizing masculinist ideas throughout the history of 
philosophy. While Irigaray’s early work engaged the history of philosophy, 
in addition to criticizing male-dominated philosophy on its own terms, she 
“talked back,” employing “double mimesis” or a reverse mimesis through 
which she would take up the position of the feminine allotted to women in 
the texts of Plato, Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, 
Heidegger, and others, by repeating their words back to them in the context 
of her own parodic and lyrical discourse. By so doing, she challenged the 
limited position assigned to woman as mere reflection of man and opened up 
a space for another voice (see “And the One Does Not Stir Without the 
Other”). At the time, over thirty years ago, I’d never seen anything like it: so 
irreverent, clever, and passionate…and at times, wickedly funny.  
While lately Irigaray has turned away from that early mimetic style in 
favor of a more direct approach, throughout her writings she has been, and 
continues to be, concerned with developing an elemental philosophy born 
from earth, air, fire, and water, that includes all living beings embedded in 
their environments and the dense web of relationships that sustain them, 
particularly relations with vegetal life.  
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In her first book, Speculum of the Other Woman (1974), she railed against 
Plato and Freud for privileging vision over touch and disavowing the 
sensuousness of our embodied and sexuate experience. That book, which was 
her thesis at Ecole Freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris) got her 
expelled and she lost her teaching post at the University of Vincennes.2 She 
says she wrote that book, not in a library or at a desk, but in the woods or by 
the sea. In subsequent work, she criticized Heidegger for forgetting the 
density of air so essential for life in favor of the clearing, devoid of life (1983). 
And, in Amante Marine (1980), she challenged Nietzsche for forgetting the 
maternal waters out of which all humans are born in favor of great heights 
and the rarified air of mountaintops. The following year, she published 
Elemental Passions, an ode to the elements that sustain us, and through which 
we encounter each other as sexuate beings. And her recent work, Through 
Vegetal Being (2016) and A New Culture of Energy, continues to insist that 
Western philosophy, and Western thought in general, has not come to terms 
with what it means to be sexuate beings living together on earth. 
My short essay on Irigaray’s relation to Nietzsche could be divided into 
the beginnings of six arguments: First, Nietzsche continues to hold a special 
place in Irigaray’s thinking. Second, Amante Marine is an important part of 
Irigaray’s elemental philosophy. Third, Irigaray’s insistence on depth over 
surface in Amante Marine points to two different ways Nietzsche has been 
taken up in French Philosophy, which could be characterized as the difference 
between surface and depth. Fourth, Irigaray’s Amante Marine anticipates the 
most recent direction in Nietzsche scholarship, which focuses on plants and 
the earth. Fifth, following Nietzsche, Irigaray suggests that we can learn 
lessons about sharing the earth from plants. And, finally, Irigaray’s elemental 
philosophy resonates with my own conception of earth ethics as 
responsiveness to other earthlings and our environment, which I develop in 
my recent book Earth and World.  
The Place of Nietzsche in Irigaray’s Thought 
In her search for philosophical companionship on her journey toward a 
new humanity that embraces sexuate being beyond mere sex or reproduction, 
and towards love and the exchange of energy, she suggests that Nietzsche is 
the most receptive philosopher to accompanying her on her path.  Still 
lamenting his “mistake” of preferring mountains and ice over trees and 
forests, but setting him apart from the rest of the history of philosophy, she 
says in Through Vegetal Being:  
As for Nietzsche, he takes a great interest in feminine 
figures and characters, especially as representing life; he 
criticizes their failings with fierceness and affirms that only 
maternity can correct them; nevertheless, he acknowledges 
that he needed a feminine companion in order to be able to 
purse his work…I am afraid that the philosophers who 
5 2  |  R e a d i n g  N i e t z s c h e  w i t h  I r i g a r a y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 1 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.877 
follow Nietzsche have not perceived the seriousness of his 
quest for a feminine companion….Nothing, thus, in the 
work of these philosophers answers the tragic appeal of 
Nietzsche to a feminine companion in order to become 
capable of crossing the bridge toward a new humanity. 3 
Perhaps this is why, written thirty-seven years ago, Luce Irigaray’s 
Amante Marine remains one of her most amorous works, which she describes 
as, “not a book on Nietzsche but with Nietzsche who is for me a partner in 
love.”4 The first section is written as the final love-letter to end a bittersweet 
affair because the addressee, the male-lover, is incapable of 
marrying/merrying an-other; he loves always only himself.  The feminine 
and the woman that he embraces so tightly (that he becomes confused about 
his own identity) is just a projection of himself. Nietzsche, and his 
characters—Dionysus, Apollo, Christ, and Zarathustra—all appropriate 
woman, the feminine, and, especially, the maternal. Irigaray suggests that 
man forgets his maternal origin, invents instead a masculine birth, usurps 
maternal creative powers, and embraces only the eternal return of the same, 
namely himself, in what she calls a “hommo-sexual” (with two m’s as in 
homme) economy of the same.5 
When Irigaray finally mentions Nietzsche by name in the penultimate 
section of Marine Lover, she suggests that his reenactment, or parody, of the 
Christian advent can result in his desired revaluation of values “only if he 
goes beyond the Father-son relationship. If he announces—beyond 
Christianity?—that only through difference can the incarnation unfold 
without murderous or suicidal passion. Rhythm and measure of a female 
other that endlessly, undoes the autological circle of discourse, thwarts the 
eternal return of the same, opens up every horizon through the affirmation of 
another point of view whose fulfillment can never be predicted…”6 Following 
Nietzsche, yet going beyond, Irigaray criticizes Christianity for forgetting the 
most important part of Christ's message, incarnation, and that in Christian 
mythology, Christ healed with touch and love.7  
Amante Marine and Irigaray’s Elemental Philosophy 
In Marine Lover, Irigaray describes earth as the forgotten maternal soil 
that nourishes man even as Christianity turns her into a tomb out of which 
man rises to return to his father. Driven out of the garden that is the 
abundance of earth’s flora and fauna, Christianity turns earth into “a great 
deportation camp, where men await celestial redemption.”8 And rather than 
go towards “the depths of the earth,” they go “toward the abysses of Heaven,” 
and “not through or for the mother’s passion, but by identification with the 
Father’s Word.”9  
If, as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra proclaims, the Übermensch is the “meaning 
of the earth,”10 Irigaray’s Marine Lover suggests that like the Christianity he 
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criticizes, Nietzsche, too, has turned the earth (and the sea) into a tomb and 
mined its depths only to soar above it and leave it behind. She asks, “Is the 
reign of the superman at hand when the whole earth becomes sublime 
discourse, when all that remains of her is her praise in the memory of 
ghosts?”11  
Sailing on the sea, but never exploring its depths, flying above the surface 
of the earth, but never exploring beneath its crust, this is how Irigaray 
describes a masculinist philosophy that substitutes words for bodies and 
forgets our materiality. She takes Nietzsche to task for staying on the surface 
of both sea and earth and never going deeper. She says, “Deeper than the solid 
crust you must now descend to announce the meaning of the earth…a solid 
plane is never just a solid plane. it rests on subterranean and submarine life, 
on capped fires and winds which yet stir ceaselessly beneath that shell.”12 
Surface and Depth in French Philosophy 
We might say that the juxtaposition between solid crust and the 
subterranean or submarine, points to a difference in the way Nietzsche has 
been taken up by contemporary French philosophy, namely the difference 
between privileging metaphors of surface or metaphors of depth.  Arguably, 
Deleuze and Foucault, for example, are attracted to metaphors of surface--
stretched membranes, plateaus, and rhizomes--emphasizing what we might 
call external or horizontal growth and mechanical repetition, whereas 
Kristeva, Irigaray, and, to some extent Derrida, prefer fleshier or juicer 
metaphors, for example, Kristeva’s psychic space, Irigaray’s sap, and Irigaray 
and Derrida’s blood, and other bodily fluids metabolizing, or internal 
processes such as autoimmunity, emphasizing what we might call internal or 
vertical growth and biological repetition--although to be sure, Derrida, and 
Irigaray insist on essential relationality (rather than mere intersections or 
flipped-sides) between the horizontal and the vertical,  surface and depth, 
external and internal processes.   
Related to this question of surface and depth, in her early work, Irigaray 
develops the notion of the sensible-transcendental to point to the way in 
which fleshy existence not only goes beneath or below the surface but also 
beyond it via encounters (or in the interval) between living beings.13 In her 
most recent work, breathing is an essential connection between surface and 
depth, and inside and outside, that not only signals our dependence on our 
environment--particularly, air--but also our independence, since we take our 
first breath on our own only after we come into the world out of our mother’s 
bodies. Indeed, speaking of breath, in Through Vegetal Being, Irigaray says, 
“Only some yogis, and the man of the mountains that Nietzsche was, still 
remember smelling as a path for spiritual becoming. Now our nose is certainly 
the privileged sense to pass, above all through breathing, from a natural to a 
spiritual life.”14 And this passage from natural to spiritual, so necessary for 
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humanity’s future, depends upon diving into the depths of the soil and the 
sea.  
Amante Marine Anticipates Recent Nietzsche Scholarship 
In this regard, Irigaray’s elemental philosophy, and her engagement with 
Nietzsche’s animals, plants, and the meaning of the earth, prefigure and 
anticipate some of the most exciting recent Nietzsche scholarship in English. 
For example, Vanessa Lemm’s book Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy, and more 
recently, her articles on Nietzsche and plants, Gary Shapiro’s new book 
Nietzsche’s Earth, along with remarks in Michael Marder’s Plant-Thinking, and 
of course, Through Vegetal Being, his dialogue with Irigaray.  
Citing Nietzsche’s frequent mentions of plants and cultivation, Lemm 
argues, “from the perspective of the totality of life human value creation is 
continuous with value creation in animals and plants.” As Nietzsche suggests 
in Human all too Human, “to live means to judge, measure, evaluate”15 such 
that human value grows out of the “moral character of plants and animals,” 
and from whom there is much we can learn.16  
Shapiro calls Nietzsche’s a “garden philosophy,” quoting aphorisms 
such as “Gardener and Garden”: “Woe to the thinker who is not the gardener 
but only the soil of the plants that grow in him”17, and “Don’t forget the 
garden…And have people who are around you as a garden—or as music on 
the waters in the evening, when the day is turned to memories” from Beyond 
Good and Evil18, or Zarathustra’s “garden happiness”19, and again from 
Human all too Human, the section entitled “Vegetation of Happiness” that 
describes “little gardens of happiness” “sprouting” in the volcanic ground of 
suffering that makes up life.20 Finally, speaking of the surface and the depth 
of the earth as what we could call a body with organs, Zarathustra says that 
although humans constitute a disease on the skin or surface of the earth, “the 
heart of the earth is of gold.”21   
Shapiro reads Nietzsche’s notion of Menchen-Erde, Human-Earth, as an 
anti-teleological, anti-theological, “translation of the recently named 
geological era of the anthropocene…during which the earth begins to 
undergo transformation through human activity.”22 He reads Nietzsche’s 
directive to be loyal to the earth as a call for vigilance to the terrible power of 
human engagement. In addition, we could interpret Nietzsche’s directive to 
be loyal to the earth as a call for a new type of responsibility, beyond good 
and evil, beyond praise and blame, and beyond traditional humanist 
philosophies. Nietzsche suggests that we must cultivate ourselves as plants in 
nourishing soil, and become our own gardeners, to grow into a new form of 
humanity, more like plants in tuned with our environment.23  
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Learning from Plants 
Following Nietzsche, Irigaray’s writings are not only full of plant 
metaphors, but also recently propose that human beings can learn from 
dwelling with plants. Particularly by dwelling with trees in forests, we learn 
ethical lessons needed to nourish a new humanity based on love rather than 
hate and sharing rather than hording or dominating. It is important to note, 
however, that both Nietzsche and Irigaray envision a unique place for a new 
humanity, not merely as human animals or human plants in the continuum 
of life, but also as responsible gardeners tending the garden that is our 
destiny, along with the garden earth and its related fate.  
In her latest published work, Irigaray maintains that the energy of human 
sexuate desire is neither vegetal sap nor animal instinct, and neither is it 
aimed at the Good nor designed for possessing objects, but rather “human 
desire has other possibilities that we must realize in order to accomplish our 
human destiny.”24 “We are working for us becoming ourselves,” she says, 
“following the Nietzschean teaching ‘Become who you are!’…”25 Reminiscent 
of Nietzsche, too, in this latest work, she describes herself coming out of the 
garden or woods, or coming down from the mountain, in search of human 
companionship essential to our uniquely human life: “For various reasons, 
the state of bliss that I experienced in the garden or in the woods—not to yet 
tell of the mountains—could not last. The dusk will arrive at sundown: 
perhaps a shower of rain will force me to seek shelter, and obviously, we are 
not always at the beginning of spring or the heart of summer. Fortunately, the 
desire for a human companion helped me to endure mourning for the 
impossible permanence of bliss in nature.”26  
She goes on to describe the task of bringing the bliss of nature back into 
human relations through our sexuate desire, which is always beyond mere 
sexual relations, and is our way of being in the world. And here is where 
Irigaray parts company with Nietzsche.27  “Cultivating this desire,” Irigaray 
says, “asks us to remain two, which requires us to use and develop our natural 
forms in a human way…Such an evolution necessitates our respect for the 
elements composing the macrocosm and their appropriation to the 
microcosm that we are.”28 She is clear that by appropriation she does not 
mean assimilation or possession but rather a “transfiguration of our physical 
nature” into “our relational,” “sexuate” way of being. Sexuate desire, 
“fertilized,” as she says, by the elements, is “awakened by an other, especially 
another human being,” but not exclusively other humans.29 In deed, 
awakening to the possibility of this awakening of desire in relation to other 
living beings, is necessary for what she imagines as the transfiguration of 
human beings into beings who not only acknowledge their sexuate way of 
being in the world and on the earth, but also learn to love the earth and other 
earthlings through that sexuate energy.  
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While Nietzsche embraces multiplicity, Irigaray insists on the two. 
Possibly against the grain of Irigaray’s thought, I would argue that one way 
to read Irigaray’s insistence on two is to realize that we can’t have multiplicity 
until we have two. We need to move from one to two before we can move 
from one to many. And, as Irigaray provocatively claims in An Ethics of Sexual 
Difference, every age has its central problem that goes unthought, and sexual 
difference is the problem of our age.  
Irigaray and Earth Ethics 
Returning to Irigaray’s engagement with Nietzsche after so many years 
away, I see the seeds of my own recent book Earth and World. There, engaging 
with Kant, Arendt, Heidegger and Derrida, I develop an ethics of earth 
grounded on the affirmation of the multiplicity and diversity of worlds that 
make the earth a living planet. This earth ethics emerges from the tension 
between the absolutely unique place of each one and the collectively shared 
bond to the earth, both of which necessarily constitute the life of the planet. It 
is not just that we share physical space, or proximity, on the surface of the 
earth, but more significantly, we share a special bond to the earth as our only 
home, whether home or habitat.  None of us—no earthlings—can live 
elsewhere, at least not yet. This singular bond of all living beings to the earth 
and to other earthlings directly, and indirectly, gives rise to an ethical 
responsibility to the sustaining possibility by virtue of which we not only exist 
and survive, but also live and thrive.  All earthlings belong to earth and earth 
belongs to us.  If we see belonging not in terms of property, economy, or debt, 
but rather in terms of the longing and companionship of its archaic meanings, 
then our belonging to the earth is born from our singular bond to earth.  
Belonging as longing for companionship.  Eros is the drive towards home that 
is grounded on love of the earth. In terms of earth ethics, this belonging 
requires an affirmation of the sort St. Augustine names when he says, “I want 
you to be.” (Perhaps rather than Nietzsche’s Zarathustra’s “I am you” or “I 
am the forest”). 
As Irigaray’s engagement with Nietzsche reminds us, elemental ethics 
begins in cohabitation become companionship, and affirmation become love. 
Earth ethics is grounded in the circulations of ecosystems, biospheres, and 
environments, rather than economies, exchange and debt.  Earth ethics is not 
a system of moral rules or universal principles that we can know through 
reason or calculation. Earth ethics resonates with Irigaray’s recent conclusion: 
“computational thinking no longer has anything to teach us, while the life and 
surviving of trees do,” namely, “to build a human relational world capable of 
ensuring the coexistence between us without any domination or exclusion of 
other living beings.”30  
Earth ethics, then, is responsiveness to others and the environment by 
virtue of which we not only survive but also thrive.  This responsiveness is 
based on our earthly existence as embodied creatures sharing a planet even 
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when we do not share a world.  Rooted in the earth’s unearthly strangeness, 
which can never been known or mastered, earth ethics necessarily takes us 
beyond calculation and recognition of the other, beyond assimilation or 
destruction of the other, beyond teleology or utility, and towards responsive 
dwelling by acknowledging our cohabitation and interdependence in order 
to become earthly companions. … The meaning of the earth as compassionate 
response-ability.  
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